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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the same cause of action instituted against him in that state.
The defendant alleged that the deposition was merely a
ruse for the purpose of enticing him into the state in order
to secure service of process, the Supreme Court, however
upheld the writ of summons. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland agreed with that decision on the facts presented
but distinguished the present case on several material dif-
ferences. Here the parties were not at arms length, nor
was it contemplated by the defendant that they would be-
come so, and the defendant was directly misled by the
representations of the plaintiff and was thus decoyed with-
in the jurisdiction of the Maryland court. In the Jaster
v. Currie1° case, however, the plaintiff and the defendant
were already party litigants, and although the defendant
came into the state as the result of the plaintiff's notice
of the deposition, the deposition could have been arbitrarily
taken and there was no misrepresentation with regard to
the motives of the plaintiff or any other circumstance lead-
ing to the service of process on the defendant.
From a consideration of the facts of the instant case
and the cases cited by the court as authority for its deci-
sion, it becomes apparent that in all of them there exists the
common denominator of a false and fraudulent representa-
tion on the part of the plaintiff by which the defendant is
induced to enter the state, when the true purpose of the
device was to procure service of process upon him. Where
such a situation occurs the Court of Appeals in the Margos
v. Moroudas case" has clearly established the rule that the
wrongdoer shall not be allowed to profit by his wrongs,
and upon proper motion, the writ of summons will be
quashed.
"CLEAN HANDS" NOT REQUIRED FOR
BIGAMY ANNULMENT
Townsend v. Morgan, alias Townsend, et al.'
In this case the plaintiff-appellant-husband brought
a suit for annulment of marriage, alleging bigamy, against
defendant - appellee - wife. There was joined as a co-
defendant a building association, for the purpose of the
further relief of clarifying title to certain real estate in-
10 Ibi .
11 Supra, n. 1.
163 A. 2d 743 (Md. 1949).
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volved in the situation.2 The plaintiff had been married
before, and had last heard from his absent first wife some
nine or ten years before the marriage to the defendant.
Whether he had believed his first wife to be either dead or
divorced is obscure, but she was still alive and not yet
divorced3 from him at the time of the second marriage to
the defendant. The trial court denied the annulment on the
ground that the "clean hands" doctrine deprived the plain-
tiff of equitable relief. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the granting of the
annulment and other relief.
This note is being written in terms of the law as it
stood at the time of the decision of the case by the Court
of Appeals. Since then, the Legislature has passed a statute5
purporting to preserve the legitimacy of the issue of mar-
riages which are annulled. What effect this statute will
have remains to be seen, and it will be subsequently dis-
cussed in the REviEw in proper course. An offhand judg-
ment would be that the statute should have no effect on the
specific doctrine of this case, although it will probably have
some slight impact on the matter of whether annulments
are to be granted.
The opinion of the Court surveyed very thoroughly the
complicated history of annulment procedures in Mary-
land, which had culminated in the then latest revisions by
the Legislature of 1947. This history and the latest revisions
have also been treated in the REVIEw in one of the issues
published since that Legislature."
It is interesting to note that the case here was instituted
against the defendant wife both by her maiden name and
the married name. There seems to be no set rule about this,
2Plaintiff also sought partition of the property held by him and his
second wife as tenants by the entireties, and so he Joined as co-defendant
a building association which held the mortgage on the property, for the
purpose of clearing the whole matter up.
a The plaintiff himself obtained a divorce from his first wife after the time
of the marriage 'to the second. He did this because of doubt as to the title to
the property, and he obtained it in the interim between taking the title
to the property in the name of himself and his second wife and later having
the ground rent also put in their names as tenants by the entireties. Of
course, this divorce was not in time to save the validity of the second
marriage, and it is but an accident in the case and in this discussion of it.
' A minor aspect of the case also rejected the defendant's contention that
the bill was multifarious, and it was ruled that it was proper to join both
an annulment suit and a bill for the partition of the property. It is not
proposed in this note to give formal treatment to this aspect of the case,
although the RuviEw may treat the point later in another connection, in
the course of contrasting this case with certain other recent cases involving
the secondary point.
:Md. Laws 1949, Ch. 29 adding Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, Sec. 41B.
Comment, Annulment Jurisdictfon Clarified (1948) 9 Md. L. Rev. 63.
19491
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and some Maryland annulment cases have been docketed
in the married name and some in the maiden name of the
wife. It seems that, regardless of the rule, the practice
adopted here is the better one, in that it makes for success-
ful searching of the records whenever it is sought to trace
the pedigree of one whose marriage may have been an-
nulled.
The Court pointed out that the clean hands doctrine
cannot be followed when the result would be to sustain
a relation which is denounced by a statute or is contrary
to public policy. In annulment proceedings for bigamy,
the interest of the State is paramount to the grievances
of the parties, and the interests of unborn children may
be affected, and consequently they felt that this was no
proper place for the clean hands doctrine. That would be
proper, however, if it were an ordinary contract, where
one contracting party who had acted unfairly was seeking
the aid of a court of Equity in the matter.
The Court cited the Simmons case7 from the District of
Columbia, which is perhaps one of the leading ones on
the matter; and as well another Maryland case8 where the
illicit relationship between the parties made no difference,
and it was held that the mistress could maintain a bill to
remove the forged deed as a cloud on prior acquired title,
notwithstanding the illicit relationship. In fact, it should
be noted that, in that Maryland case, the .situation was
almost equivalent to that of the principal one now being
noted. The impediment in question was forgery of the
deed, which the Court pointed out made the transaction
a complete nullity, which did not need a proceeding so
to declare, although one was desirable, hence "clean hands"
would not be a requirement for the relief sought, inasmuch
as the whole transaction (as in the principal case, the
bigamous marriage) could be attacked collaterally. Further-
more, the Court pointed out that a bigamous marriage is
void, not voidable, and cannot be ratified by continuing
to live together after the time as of which the parties
become eligible to marry each other. Nor, lacking the
institution of common law marriage in Maryland, can a
subsequent and valid marriage for the first time be spelled
out by their agreeing to continue to live together after
the impediment is removed. Nothing short of a sufficient
Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F. 2d 690, 54 A. L. R. 75, 57 App. D. C. 216
(1927).
1 Maskell v. Hill, 55 A. 2d 842 (Md. 1947).
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new ceremony after the time of eligibility will take away
the voidness of a bigamous marriage.
The Court also emphasized that the fact that the hus-
band was immune from criminal prosecution for the crime
of bigamy,9 because his first wife had been absent more
than seven years did not save the civil validity of his
marriage to his second wife, which was nevertheless void
if the first wife was still alive and undivorced at the time
of the second marriage. This serves to emphasize a point
often overlooked, that there is no necessary relation be-
tween the criminal punishability for participating in a mar-
riage and the end product of civil validity of the status
resulting from the ceremony. Conversely, there are in-
stances where persons may be criminally punishable and
yet the marriage will be totally valid and be neither void
nor voidable.'"
With reference to the clean hands argument, it should
be pointed out that the plaintiff's bill of complaint in effect
did allege that he had clean hands. It alleged that he was
mistaken in his belief that he could lawfully marry the
defendant at that time, and it argued that he did not
seek immoral relations, and that as soon as he discovered
doubts in the matter he himself obtained a divorce from
the first wife. Be that as it may, the case was heard on
demurrer in the trial court on the grounds of clean hands,
and the trial court denied the relief, and erroneously ac-
cepted the doctrine that unclean hands, if so, would dis-
entitle to the annulment. The Court of Appeals reversed,
and, by its language, indicates that even one who is know-
ingly a bigamist may nevertheless seek an annulment
despite the uncleanness of his hands.
Thus the Court put the granting of the annulment on
the ground that the impediment of bigamy, when proved,
makes the marriage totally void so that no proceeding is
necessary in order to annul it. It should be permitted
each partner, even though there was knowledge of bigamy
at the time, to claim a ruling in the matter. This points
out that the nature of an annulment of a totally void mar-
riage is something different from an annulment of a merely
voidable one." In the former case the annulment is merely
a declaratory ruling of an impediment, which can be as-
serted for the first time collaterally in any case where
o Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 19.
,0E.g., violation of the marriage age statute, as is brought out in Com-
ment, infra, n. 26.
1 In general on this, see Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Mary.
land and their Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211.
1949]
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the question is in focus. In the latter situation an annul-
ment is a necessary step in order to permit the defect in
the marriage to be asserted in any other connection.
It is well that this case forces us to realize the juridical
difference between the two types of annulments, those for
void marriages, and those for voidable marriages. It forces
thinking about the numerous problems held in common by
all declaratory procedures, be they general declaratory
procedures under the Uniform Act, or the older and more
specific procedures which are in effect declaratory proced-
ures, such as bills to impress a trust, a mensa divorce,
quieting of title, and the like. The RvIEW has discussed
in another connection certain of the common qualities of
declaratory procedures, particularly the territorial juris-
diction one, in noting the case of Ortman v. Coane," a case
involving a bill to impress a trust on corporate stock.
There are three procedures in Maryland for annulling
a bigamous marriage, bill in equity for annulment,13 bill
for divorce because void ab initio," and incidentally in con-
nection with a criminal conviction of one or both of the
parties of bigamy." The third one would not have been
available in this case, because the husband waited more
than the seven-year period beyond which one may marry
without danger of criminal prosecution. But, despite this,
his marriage is civilly void, and it can be otherwise an-
nulled or collaterally attacked when the problem arises.
The mere fact that certain considerations exempt him from
criminal guilt does not save the civil validity of the mar-
riage which is in question here.
Then, too, it might be that he would have been immune
from guilt, even within seven years, if he had sufficient
bona fide belief in his wife's being dead or divorced. This
would depend upon whether Maryland accepts the English
rule of the Tolson ca~e6 or the prevailing American rule
to the contrary. The American rule does not allow a mis-
take of fact within seven years to be a defense." Further-
more, the criminal procedure would not be available for
a bigamous marriage which took place outside of Maryland,
because criminal jurisdiction to try the case would be lack-
" Ortman v. Coane, 181 Md. 596, 31 A. 2d 320, 145 A. L. R. 1388 (1943).
noted in Note, Action to Impress Trust on Stock is in Person4am (1944) 8
Md. L. Rev. 289.
IsMd. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, Sec. 38.
"'Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16. Sec. 40.
11 Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 62, Sec. 16.
Regina v. Tolson, 2 Q. B. D. 168 (1889).
"Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919) which by
dictun indicates a view contra the English rule.
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ing. Then, it would have to be brought as an equitable
proceeding, or a bill for divorce, based on the residence
of either party here at the time of the divorce proceedings.
It can be speculated as to how far the doctrine of this
case, that unclean hands are no bar, will be extended to
annulments for the other possible impediments that can
be litigated. No doubt it will be extended to lack of cere-
mony, miscegenation, adjudicated insanity, and perhaps
apparent lack of marital intention, which are the other
"void" grounds. 8
Whether it will be extended to the voidable impedi-
ments is another matter. Certainly it should not apply
to those that involve the contract elements,' 9 i.e., intent,
insanity," intoxication, fraud, and duress. The extant law
of these indicates that only the aggrieved or injured party
can seek annulment for these reasons, so that the party
who has unclean hands, the other party in the picture,
should not be allowed to litigate. It would be hard to
imagine that one who secretly intended not to marry where
the other had so intended, or that one who knowingly mar-
ried an insane person or a drunken person, or who perpe-
trated the fraud, or inflicted the duress, should be allowed
to seek annulment for these reasons. The answer seems
clear about that.
On the other hand, for the voidable impediment of re-
lationship it would seem that clean hands should not be
necessary. This is for the reason that when the courts2'
declare such marriages to be only voidable, they must have
realized that in practically every situation, save the very
unlikely one of ignorance of being related, both parties are
aware that they are violating the law when they marry
within too close degree.
For the impediment of impotence, which is probably
only a voidable one, as the only doctrine about it in Mary-
land is that it is a divorce ground,22 the answer seems ob-
" This classification accepts the ideas presented in the article cited, supra,
n. 11, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 224, 231, 237-8.
29 Ibid., 236 et seq.
21 Consider Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N. Y. 424, 155 N. E. 728, 51 A. L. R.
844 (1927), which held that the sane spouse, even where be had been
ignorant of the contractual insanity of the defendant, could not seek
annulment for that cause.
11Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison. 22 Md. 468 (1864), held that a
marriage of uncle and niece, performed in violation of Maryland law, was
at worst only voidable. Contrast Fensterwald v. Burke, 129 Md. 131. 98
A. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562 (1916), which recognized the full validity of such
a marriage, valid where performed in another State, by an unusual excep-
tion for a specified religion.
n Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, See. 40.
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scure. The statute does not make it clear whether it means
to permit the impotent spouse to be plaintiff and to be
allowed to assert his or her own impotence. The only Mary-
land case23 has been one brought against the impotent party
by the other spouse. There is doctrine from another state24
that the impotent spouse may not be party plaintiff for this
reason, unless a statute so permits. Of course, a difference
exists between one who was unaware of his or her im-
potence and seeks to be plaintiff, and one who, knowing
of the impotence, married the defendant and later seeks
annulment for that reason. In this latter situation it would
seem more appropriate to apply the clean hands doctrine
than in the former, other things equal. 5
For the impediment of age, special considerations might
obtain in view of the fact that opinion2" has it that violation
of the age statutes makes the marriage neither void nor
voidable anyhow, and that the common law rule of void-
ness under seven and voidable from seven to twelve
(female) or fourteen (male) is the rule in force, although
no proceeding was necessary for avoidance under the com-
mon law rule. Thus it would seem that the doctrine of this
case would apply to both void and voidable child marriages.
The rule of the case seems eminently sound, and it
serves to clarify the law, and further to accentuate the dis-
tinction between totally void and merely voidable mar-
riages, an important distinction in Maryland law. Space
does not permit comparison of the Maryland ideas about
the rule with those of other states where different con-
siderations obtain. For instance, some states have a peculiar
doctrine that a marriage is void from and after the time
it is annulled, whereas the Maryland doctrine seems to be
that a void marriage is void from the beginning, and the
annulling of a voidable marriage has the effect of declaring
that it had been void from the beginning, although the
annulment' is a necessary step so to rule.
"J. G. v. H. G., 33 Md. 401 (1870).
'Anon. v. Anon., 69 Misc. 489,126 N. Y. S. 149 (1910).
The question of any difference between a plaintiff who can assert ignor-
ance of, although not complicity in the impediment asserted, and one
who clearly has "unclean hands" Is little likely to arise in connection with
the "voidable" impediments. The Hoadlell case, Rupra. n. 20. denied annul-
ment for insanity to one in the former situation. But for insanity, the
question of the distinction is little likely to arise within the framework of
the voidable impediments.
"See Comment, A Query About the New Marriage Age Law (1939), 3
Md. L. Rev. 340, discussing what is now Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 62,
See. 7.
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